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by Becky L. JACOBS, Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law (United States).[1]
(#_ftn1)

Environmental protection and natural resource management are highly complicated, dynamic processes
intersecting natural and social systems. Policies related to these issues involve a broad array of inputs,
including, among others, scientific data, legal information, value judgments, philosophical perspectives,
and economic decisions, and they can have momentous consequences not only at international, national,
and state levels, but also for communities and individuals. In recognition of these impacts, policy and
lawmakers in 50+ countries are pursuing community-based approaches to environmental protection and
natural resource management by delegating some degree of management and decision-making authority
over parks or other protected areas; forests; water, coastal resources, and fisheries; wildlife; and other
natural resources to community user groups.[2] (#_ftn2)
One framework for promoting citizen participation in the management of public natural resources is the
Community-Based Natural Resource Management Model (CBNRM). This model adopts a socioecological approach that integrates local institutions, customary practices, and community knowledge
structures into natural adaptive systems protection and administration. It is believed that consideration of
these factors and that involvement of local stakeholders in management, regulatory, and enforcement
processes will result in improved resource management outcomes.[3] (#_ftn3)
This paper will briefly describe the CBNRM model and will review its use in relation to various levels
and categories of legal obligations in two very different contexts. It also will consider barriers that have
been identified to citizen participation in these CBNRM models and will explore how law or other
instruments might be utilized to respond to these challenges.[4] (#_ftn4)

§1–T

M

Community-Based Natural Resource Management is a very flexible management approach. Under the
model, the state retains primary ownership of the land or other resource, and it also retains some form of
management authority.[5] (#_ftn5) Local communities in CBNRM projects assume legal obligations and
obtain rights or privileges to use and benefit from environmental or natural resources in a defined area.
[6] (#_ftn6) By incentivizing stakeholder populations to sustainably manage the relevant resource and by
leveraging that population’s local expertise about natural and social conditions, the CBNRM approach
seeks to improve environmental and socioeconomic outcomes.[7] (#_ftn7)
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CBNRM programs are designed and implemented in their own cultural contexts, and they can take
multiple forms. There are, however, several elements that frequently appear to be present in successful
programs. For example, researchers agree that most effective collaborative schemes have clearly defined
communities of users and resource systems.[8] (#_ftn8) These elements ensures that those who bear the
cost of the program receive its benefits. Relatedly, in successful CBNRM ventures, external
governmental entities recognize the rights or interests of community users in the resource,[9] (#_ftn9) and
community rules require an equitable alignment of user costs and benefits.[10] (#_ftn10)
Monitoring, proportional sanctions, and low-cost dispute resolution are other features commonly found
in the rules of productive CBNRM programs, as are rules: (1) that have been developed by or in
collaboration with the community, (2) that are based upon local conditions, and (3) that are flexible and
incorporate procedures for future modifications.[11] (#_ftn11) Sufficient external support, whether
financial or administrative, governmental or non-governmental, is another important factor. [12] (#_ftn12)
Not all prosperous CBNRM programs will be based upon these design elements, and, concomitantly,
failing projects may feature many of these components. However, a combination of these organizational
characteristics appears to typify robust institutions for managing common-pool resources.[13] (#_ftn13)

§2–E
CBRNM sites are located throughout the world, and the model’s principles have been applied across a
broad range of natural resources and communities. The following two examples demonstrate its
flexibility and its potential for improving the quality and effectiveness of citizen participation in
environmental and natural resource management.
A) CITES and Wildlife in Namibia
The Republic of Namibia is a sparsely populated country situated along the south Atlantic coast of
Africa.[14] (#_ftn14) It is a member of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the international convention designed to ensure that international trade
does not threaten the sustainability of listed wild animals and plant species.[15] (#_ftn15)
After gaining its independence in the early 1990’s, the new Namibian government was confronted with
the monumental task of promoting social development and economic growth while preserving the
nation’s rapidly disappearing wildlife resources. Because hunting prohibitions had been inadequately
enforced, impoverished Namibians reportedly had hunted wildlife illegally on communal lands and
cooperated with commercial poachers.[16] (#_ftn16) These conditions resulted in the decimation of a
number of species in the country, including black rhinos, elephants, zebras, and lions; one source
estimates that wildlife populations in northern Namibia may have been reduced by up to 90%.[17]
(#_ftn17)

Consistent with its obligations under CITES and its goals to promote both sustainable economic and
wildlife resource development, the Namibian government enacted the Nature Conservation Amendment
Act of 1996 (1996 Act) authorizing any group of people residing on communal land to apply for
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO/rt/printerFriendly/48/129
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conservancy status.[18] (#_ftn18) Legal conservancies must have a defined membership with a
representative management committee, a defined border, and a legally-enforceable constitution that
provides for a wildlife management strategy and an equitable distribution of benefits.[19] (#_ftn19) The
Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) has the discretion to recognize a conservancy, subject to
any conditions, and to withdraw or amend that recognition at any time. Recognized conservancies have
the right to hunt, capture, cull, and sell “huntable” game and may apply to the MET for permits to use
protected game quotas for trophy hunting.[20] (#_ftn20)
As of 2014, there were 82 registered conservancies, impacting approximately 177,435 people and covering an
estimated 20% of Namibia’s land mass.[21] (#_ftn21) There are similar community associations operating in a
Namibian national park and in over 30 community forests.[22] (#_ftn22) Advocates of Nambia’s conservancy
programs proudly note that the 1996 Act’s legislative framework “devolves 100% of the benefits from the
sustainable use of wildlife to resident communities … and recognizes the conservancy as the legitimate
manager and beneficiary of both consumptive and non-consumptive commercial forms of wildlife use.”[23]
(#_ftn23) These benefits purportedly advance sustainability goals by improving the competitiveness of
wildlife vis-à-vis agriculture as a land-use and by creating legal incentives for communities to conserve
wildlife.[24] (#_ftn24) Conservancy monitoring systems report that poaching has decreased;[25] (#_ftn25)
Namibian elephant populations increased from approximately 5,000 to 16,000 from 1984 to 2008,[26]
(#_ftn26) and other wildlife species have experienced similarly impressive population increases.[27] (#_ftn27)
The recovery of conservancy wildlife stocks has stimulated private sector investment in the conservancies in
the form of trophy hunting and wildlife harvesting as well as tourism lodges and camps, often the result of
joint ventures between investors and conservancies.[28] (#_ftn28)
Citizen participation in the conservancies produce benefits for users beyond the economic and
environmental. Members develop administrative, dispute resolution, management, and leadership
competencies; expand their social networks; and generally enhance social capital.[29] (#_ftn29) Namibian
conservancies are responding to gender equity issues: women purportedly are active participants on
conservancy committees and in management positions in registered conservancies. Conservancies are
leveraging their financial, physical, and human resources for rural development activities such as local
education, water supply, and public health. While some have noted program shortcomings,[30] (#_ftn30)
most agree that Namibia’s conservancy program is a successful example of CBNRM.
B) The Magnuson-Stevens Act and the U.S. Atlantic Cod Fishery
The New England coast of the U.S. is home to the Atlantic cod fishery, once one of the most productive
fishing grounds for this fish in the world.[31] (#_ftn31) Stocks collapsed in the 1990’s due to overfishing,
and they are still dangerously in decline.[32] (#_ftn32) Commercial and recreational fishing interests,
politicians and regulators, the environmental community, and the general public all have a stake in this
fishery and have opinions about how best to respond to the crisis.
All US fisheries are subject to overlapping layers of legal authority. At the national level,[33] (#_ftn33)
the 1976 Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson Act)[34] (#_ftn34) and its
reauthorizing legislation, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnusonhttp://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO/rt/printerFriendly/48/129
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Stevens Act), also referred to as the MSA or the Sustainable Fisheries Act, establish exclusive federal
authority over fisheries from three miles to two hundred miles offshore.[35] (#_ftn35) The Magnuson Act
was promulgated initially to respond to foreign fishing by promoting the development of a domestic fleet
and to involve local fishing communities in the management process; the reauthorized MagnusonStevens Act also incorporates conservation goals for all US fisheries, including stock recovery provisions
such as annual catch limits, accountability measures, and possible essential fish habitat (EFH)
designations.[36] (#_ftn36)
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries) shares federal responsibility for fisheries with
eight regional councils,[37] (#_ftn37) including the New England Fishery Management Council
(NEFMC). NEFMC has management authority over the Atlantic cod fishery and is required by the
Magnuson-Stevens Act to formulate a Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for relevant stock. Its Northeast
Multispecies (Groundfish) FMP establishes management measures for thirteen groundfish species,
including the Atlantic cod.[38] (#_ftn38) Early plans failed to reverse the cod crisis.
In 2003, in an effort to experiment with alternative conservation models, the NEFMC advanced one
proposal, Amendment 13,[39] (#_ftn39) to the Northeast Multispecies FMP. This proposal, among other
things, created a CBNRM-like trial program that allowed fishermen to organize and manage their own
“sectors.” Sectors received a prescribed allocation of the fishery’s quota based upon their fishing history,
a fundamental shift of approach from a management regime based primarily upon input controls such as
area closures, vessel and gear restrictions, and limits on “days at seas.”[40] (#_ftn40) The trial was
deemed a success, and, in 2010, the sector approach was expanded and formalized in Amendment 16.
[41] (#_ftn41)
Each approved sector develops a binding Operations Plan and a Sector Contract with compliance plans
for quotas and conservation measures. NOAA Fisheries must approve the Operations Plan, and all sector
members must execute the Sector Contract.[42] (#_ftn42) If a sector complies with its quota, its future
annual catch limit will not be reduced even if the general fishery exceeds its target fishing allocation.[43]
(#_ftn43) Sector members may trade or lease their stock allocations through their sector managers.[44]
(#_ftn44) Catch and other compliance measures are monitored.[45] (#_ftn45)
Despite the tremendous shift in operating culture that it represents, the region’s fishing community
appears to be adapting to the sector approach. NOAA Fisheries reports that sectors catch nearly 98% of
the groundfish harvest.[46] (#_ftn46) Within the sector system, members have much more flexibility to
manage their fishing. For example, they are not limited to days at sea or number of trips, and they can
freely trade quota.[47] (#_ftn47) They also can decide when to fish, allowing them to time the market
better, and sectors have begun to directly contract with large retailers. Boat size is no longer as much of a
factor, and sectors members are consolidating vessels and saving fuel. Economically, data for the 2010
fishing season indicate that, while gross revenues for groundfish in the fishery were down $1.8 million
compared 2009, total revenues increased $26.6 million.[48] (#_ftn48)
Additionally, while reductions in catch limits certainly are a primary factory, sectors appear to be assimilating
the conservation goals of the program. It is reported that no sector exceeded its quota in the first year of the
sector program.[49] (#_ftn49) Because sector fish are no longer common pool resources, sector members have
a conservation incentive to, for example, invest in gear that reduces habitat destruction and improves
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO/rt/printerFriendly/48/129
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sustainability.[50] (#_ftn50) Additionally, where before there was a strong history of antagonism between
fishing communities and scientists, academics, conservationists, and non-profits, sector members have been
incentivized due to severe financial constraints to collaborate with these groups to transition administrative
and operating practices and to monitor compliance and stock levels.[51] (#_ftn51) These collaborations have
built stronger, more resilient trust relationships, and the industry now has a more active role in the collection
and evaluation of data used for regulatory purposes.
Yet it appears that NOAA Fisheries may have implemented its innovations too late in the Atlantic cod
fishery’s decline to make a real difference in species recovery. Despite gains in domestic fish stock
sustainability overall, the acting US Secretary of Commerce declared a commercial fishery failure for the
Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery for the 2013 fishing season, and, in that year, cod catch and
price decreases contributed to a 66.2% decline in revenue.[52] (#_ftn52) In 2014, NOAA Fisheries
scientists reported that New England cod stock dropped to all-time record low levels, with a population
at only 3-4% of sustainable yield.[53] (#_ftn53) Overfishing is not the only cause of this decline;
pollution, construction activities, and the rapid warming of waters of the New England coast all have
been identified as factors in the collapse.[54] (#_ftn54) Fishery stakeholders are confronting monumental
challenges, but, from a CBNRM programmatic perspective, sector “community user groups” in the US
Atlantic cod fishery advocating for management approaches that continue to weaken or decrease stocks
clearly are failing to improve resource management outcomes, a primary objective of the CBNRM
framework.

§3–B

C

P

CBNRM

P

L

I

CBNRM has the potential to increase citizen participation in environmental and natural resource
management, strengthening the democratic process. However, as the two examples discussed above
demonstrate, there are unique challenges to involving citizens in programs that govern highly technical,
multidimensional ecological systems. Further, each CBNRM project confronts a distinct set of concerns
based upon idiosyncratic historical and sociocultural contexts.[55] (#_ftn55)
The contextual distinctions between the Namibian wildlife and the US Atlantic cod fishery CBNRM examples
are evident. While both programs manage “mobile or fugitive resources … [that require] coordination across
multiple administrative units,”[56] (#_ftn56) the profiles of the user communities and their management
challenges are vastly different.
Many Namibian conservancies, for example, encompass one or more distinct traditional communities.
Traditional authorities in these communities still exercise extensive authority, and community members
adhere to customary roles. Accordingly, while data report that women are well represented among
conservancy staffs, these staff jobs are typically aligned with culturally-ascribed gender activities such as
cleaning and cooking.[57] (#_ftn57) CBNRM programs may encourage women and other marginalized
community members to enroll in conservancies, but, without addressing existing power hierarchies, these
members are likely to feel disempowered.[58] (#_ftn58) More generally, low literacy rates are a
significant barrier to conservancy participation, either economically or managerially.
This compromises the “defined community of users” design factor that appears to be an important feature of
successful CBNRM programs, as well as several other of those characteristics. If the Namibian government
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO/rt/printerFriendly/48/129
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privileges traditional male leaders, women and other marginalized individuals may decide that their costs to
participate in the program are greater than any benefit they may derive and will withdraw their support for, or
contributions to, the program.
Law can mandate transparency, accountability, and non-discrimination, but it will not immediately reverse
historical community socio-cultural norms and traditions. Properly designed, however, legal interventions may
have the power: (1) to authorize or expand access to education and skills/technical training; (2) to provide
financing for economic and social capital development to marginalized conservancy members as a path to
influence in conservancy management; and (3) to legislate minimum committee membership allocations, voting
requirements, and flexible work scheduling.
Contrast the Namibian conservancy experiences with that of the sectors in the Northeastern US fishery.
Sector members primarily are literate business owners or employees with verifiable experience in the
Atlantic cod fishery. Because all members are jointly liable for compliance with the sector’s annual catch
limit, most sectors formed along social or cultural lines and are geographically based; sectors may be
further identified by gear type or by affiliation with an industry group.[59] (#_ftn59) While these citizens
have operated largely independently in the fishery, and they may have found it more difficult to transition
to collaborative management,[60] (#_ftn60) they have strong social networks. Network norms and other
elements of social capital likely facilitated their participation in the sector program.[61] (#_ftn61)
Yet the cod population is still crashing in the NEFCM region. While there are multiple factors affecting
cod stocks, many of the characteristics present in successful CBNRM programs also appear to be lacking
in the NEFMC sector program, potentially with negative impacts on program outcomes. For example,
many contend that the defined community in the sector system excludes a number of important users,
including important recreational interests, and that it allocates benefits unevenly.[62] (#_ftn62) Further,
the costs of participation in the program may be disproportional to the benefits for many users. Finally, in
this instance, the government appears to have all but ceded management control to sector interests,
potentially sacrificing long-term stock recovery for short-term economic motivations.
Even had all of the design features of a successful CBNRM program been present, however, a legally
enforceable model may, regrettably, have been proposed and implemented at a point in the US Atlantic
fishery when the cod population may be beyond recovery.

C
The CBNRM model has the potential to increase citizen participation in decisions that impact natural
systems. Natural resource and environmental management choices encompass a wide range of
considerations, including natural, social, political sciences, economics, cultural and other contextual
influences, and they must be made in the presence of risk and uncertainty. The first-hand ecological
knowledge of local resource users can be an invaluable component of decisions about resource
administration, and it can illuminate existing scientific data and guide future research efforts.[63]
(#_ftn63)

However, in order for their participation to be meaningful, individuals must have, or must develop, the
skills to engage in an effective, empowered, and timely way. While not a panacea, law can play a critical
role in promoting the conditions in which citizens can acquire such skills and authority. Further, law can
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO/rt/printerFriendly/48/129
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structure and adapt public participation to accommodate a CBNRM program’s cultural context, political
and economic environment, resource type, or ecological setting.
In addition to encouraging citizen participation in environmental protection and natural resource
decision-making, laws promoting CBNRM should also be crafted so as to achieve the framework’s other
primary objective, to improve resource management outcomes. Those who have the authority and
capacity to participate must be accountable for its exercise; the law must improve accountability and
transparency, at all levels of governance.
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